The pharmaceutical industry is a very promotions intensive industry. This industry has always used sales representatives to target physicians, who are a key link in sales and market share for prescription pharmaceuticals. Since August of 1997 when the Food and Drug Administration eased the restrictions on Direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA), there has been a dramatic increase in the use of DTCA by pharmaceutical firms to target end customers (patients). DTCA seems to have two different effects on pharmaceutical markets. The first is to inform patients about the availability of drugs for some ailments, thus expanding the market (informative). The second is to persuade patients to talk about specific brands when they meet physicians, with the objective of influencing market share (persuasive). We consider both effects of DTCA in the presence of a detailing program in a competitive environment. We build a game-theoretic model where firms decide on what form of DTCA to adopt (informative or persuasive) and then compete in the marketplace by choosing detailing and DTCA levels. We answer three questions: when do optimal detailing levels for a firm increase with increase in DTCA? Under what conditions would competing firms voluntarily decide to pursue informative DTCA? Finally, how should the DTCA strategy for a firm vary depending on whether it is stronger or weaker in its degree of influence in the doctor's office?
Introduction
The pharmaceutical market is characterized by very large promotional expenditures. Traditionally, these promotions have been aimed at physicians who are responsible for prescribing medications to patients. Besides detailing by sales reps to inform physicians, firms have also used advertising in medical journals to reach physicians and are now using eDetailing (electronic detailing), a variant of traditional detailing. In addition to promoting the product to doctors, firms have also promoted their brands directly to consumers. A change in the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) regulation in August of 1997 has lead to a major shift in this direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs. Prior to this change, any direct-to-consumer promotion that contained brand name and medical claims had to provide a "brief summary" of drug effectiveness, its side effects, and any contraindications. Consequently, advertising on television was very expensive. As a result of this change in regulation, firms can now advertise the brand and medical claims without the need for this summary. Firms need to include a "major statement" of the most important risks and refer consumers to other sources for more comprehensive information (Iizuka and Jin, 2005 ).
This has made TV advertising relatively affordable and cost effective. As a result of this change, direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) in the US pharmaceutical industry has increased from $800 million in 1996 to more than $ 4.2 billion in 2005. 1 As firms spend huge amounts of money on DTCA, managers wonder what exactly does DTCA do (Rosenthal, et al. 2003 , Iizuka 2005 ? It has been suggested that DTCA can help in expanding the market, in gaining market share, and in improving drug compliance by patients (Wosinska, 2005) . Empirical evidence suggests that DTCA has a significant impact on the category or product class sales (Narayanan, Desiraju and Chintagunta 2003 , Iizuka and Jin 2005 . At the same time, much of pharmaceutical advertising is at the brand level and consumers' requests for specific drug brands may influence doctors' prescribing decisions. Studies suggest that patient requests have a substantial impact on doctor behavior (Herzenstein et al., 2004) . A recent FDA study showed that 59% of doctors prescribe in the product class that their patients ask for and 46 % prescribe the brand that the patients ask for. However, Iizuka and Jin (2006) show that in the non-sedating antihistamines category, DTCA has no impact on product choice. In addition though 1 November 2006 Report by US Government Accountability Office. there is positive interaction between DTCA and detailing, this effect is very small. 2 3 Overall, it seems that DTCA has both market expanding and share increasing effects with significant ambiguity about the relative strengths of these effects. It is important to recognize that market expansion occurs due to informative advertising while share increase occurs due to persuasive advertising.
In the pharmaceutical industry context, informative advertising provides information about the disease itself including information on symptoms, possible remedies and side effects with much less emphasis on the brand being advertised. In persuasive advertising, the basic assumption is that the consumers know about the particular disease and the currently available drugs, and hence advertising emphasizes the advantages of the brand being advertised relative to other competing brands.
For example, the early advertisements for Viagra were targeted at informing the consumer about the existence of an oral pill for erectile dysfunction (informative), while the later advertisements by competitors such as Cialis emphasized the "36 hour" nature of the pill which was unique compared to other competing drugs in the market (persuasive). Another example of persuasive DTCA would be advertisements for Crestor, a cholesterol reducing drug, that compare its ability to reduce bad cholesterol by a higher percentage than its competitors, Lipitor and Zocor.
In most markets, consumers themselves make the purchasing decision. However, in the prescription drugs market, doctors act as agents and decide on which product to purchase on behalf of the consumers 4 . For any doctor to be in a position to prescribe a given firm's drug, she needs to be informed about its efficacy and possible side-effects. This communication is achieved via face-toface interaction between the doctor and the sales rep during a detailing visit. Thus, the sales that a firm achieves is influenced by both DTCA and detailing. The former affects how many patients come to a doctor's office and which drug they request for, and the latter affects what drug the doctor is comfortable prescribing.
While recognizing the two effects of advertising is an important task, a greater managerial concern is the problem of resource allocation across detailing and DTCA for a pharmaceutical firm operating in a competitive market. Several hypotheses have been proposed regarding what pharmaceutical firms should be doing in this setting. We list them as follows: 2 The DTCA and detailing interaction effect in Iizuka and Jin (2006) is statistically insignificant. 3 For a more comprehensive review of the empirical literature in this area, we refer the readers to Manchanda et al. (2005) . 4 We will be using the terms consumer and patient interchangeably. Both will imply the final user and not the doctor who acts as an agent.
• Consulting firms (e.g., Health Products Research & ZS Associates) who advise pharmaceutical firms on issues regarding pharmaceutical promotion reveal that managers in these pharmaceutical firms are concerned about the impact of increasing DTCA on the overall promotional spend. Initially, the managers may believe that they can take money out of detailing and move the same to DTCA and experience a net profit gain in the process without increasing the promotional spend. However, analysis of promotional sensitivity data by the consulting firms has revealed that introduction of DTCA may increase the ROI on detailing because of synergies. Hence detailing levels should be increased to utilize this phenomenon optimally. This in turn suggests an increase in the promotional expenditure, contrary to what the managers are expecting.
• Wosinska (2003) claims that given the unequal power of firms in a particular market, firms with a lower degree of influence in the doctor's office should not invest in DTCA since the firm stronger in detailing will capture a larger fraction of the market growth due to DTCA.
However, the real world throws up exceptions to this rule. For instance, for the past few years, the product with the highest DTCA spend is Lunesta 5 (indicated for insomnia) which is manufactured by Sepracor. They have marketed this drug successfully with a relatively small sales force as compared to Sanofi-Aventis which produces the major competing product Ambien. 6 • Finally, many questions have been raised regarding the negative impact of DTCA, particularly persuasive DTCA, on patient welfare. The solution that is frequently suggested by various interest groups is to legally enforce informative DTCA on firms. For example, the American Medical Association currently condones DTCA advertising on a case-by-case basis and recently adopted a policy that calls for DTC advertising to emphasize patient education about individual diseases rather than specific brands (Sheehan, 2003) . But it does not seem that such enforcement is always necessary. For example, AstraZeneca has volunteered to pursue balanced and socially responsible advertising ("informative" advertising) for its products 7 .
We seek an answer to the first hypothesis by posing the The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review literature related to the problems under consideration. In Section 3, we set up the general model. Section 4 details the equilibrium for firms that have similar detailing productivities and have the option of pursuing either informative or persuasive DTCA but not both. In Section 5, we assume that firms are heterogeneous in detailing productivities and analyze those cases in detail where firms adopt symmetric strategies on whether to pursue informative or persuasive DTCA. In Section 6, we provide numerical results on the equilibrium when firms are heterogeneous in detailing productivities and can pursue informative or persuasive DTCA. In Section 7, we conclude and give directions for future research.
Related Literature
Our paper broadly relates to the advertising literature, in particular to that stream of the advertising literature that addresses the impact of generic advertising (advertising that raises category volume).
of resources across time between generic and brand advertising. In our context, informative DTCA is similar to generic advertising for it expands the total market pie and persuasive DTCA is similar to brand advertising for it affects the firm's market share. Bass, et al. (2005) also focus on the free-riding problem and posit that the weaker firm free rides on generic advertising of the stronger firm and these free-riding effects lead to lower profits for the stronger firm in the short run but does not affect its long run profitability.
Informative advertising increases consumer awareness of a certain product category without influencing the preferences. Grossman and Shapiro(1984) We analyze the effects of the firm's decision to offer either informative or persuasive DTCA and its interaction with detailing. In our set up, informative DTCA increases market size while persuasive DTCA and detailing affects market share. Further, DTCA is targeted at consumers while detailing is targeted at physicians and sales is achieved due to the interaction of these two groups. This set up enables us to address two broad questions related to the pharmaceutical industry which are yet to be addressed by the extant literature: how should firms allocate resources across two forms of promotion, one of which stimulates consumer demand ("Pull") while the other stimulates physician preferences ("Push")? Further, how do these "push" and "pull" forms of promotion affect category volume versus share growth?
3 The General Model
Modeling Sales
The first step in laying out the model is to understand the effect of different kinds of promotion on firm sales. DTCA is empirically observed to affect both category sales and market share. These effects are brought forth by two different phenomena. Consider a category that is completely new (such as erectile dysfunction a few years ago) or a category that is not considered life threatening enough for most consumers to be aware of the latest possible prescription treatments (such as adult attention deficit disorder). In such a case, the purpose of DTCA is to inform consumers about the existence of prescription treatment, thus encouraging them to see a doctor for advice. We term this form of DTCA as informative DTCA. The effect of informative DTCA is to expand the market. The total number of patients is normalized to 1. Of these, some patients are aware about the existence of prescription treatment for their condition and will consult a doctor on their own irrespective of advertising exposure. We denote these patients by (1 − φ). The remaining patients can potentially approach a doctor if they are exposed to informative DTCA. These patients are denoted by φ.
Let δ i be the DTCA level of firm i, where i = 1 and 2 respectively. Let these DTCA levels lie in the range [0,1]. The higher is the spending by a firm the greater is its DTCA effectiveness. 8 Further, the content of these advertisements influences whether the effectiveness is informative or persuasive. Let k i be the level of persuasive content and 1 − k i the level of informative content 8 For example, higher spending enables a firm to buy more tv spots. This is turn increases the effectiveness of DTCA for the firm. We assume that the choices among tv spots are all of equal quality.
in the DTCA level δ i by firm i. Hence, the informative DTCA effectiveness is (1 − k i ) δ i and the persuasive DTCA effectiveness is k i δ i for firm i.
All of φ will be captured only when the informative DTCA effectiveness of both firms combined (denoted by the expression
reaches one. 9 Denote the total market by M . Given a duopoly with firm 1 at a DTCA level of δ 1 and firm 2 at a DTCA level of δ 2 , the total market for each firm would be:
When solving for the equilibrium, we need to impose the constraint
in order to ensure that the total market size M does not exceed 1. Persuasive DTCA works on the total traffic that enters the doctor's office. When patients are exposed to persuasive DTCA of a particular firm, they request the doctor to prescribe that firm's medicine. To build the effect of persuasive DTCA on market share, we need to first understand the impact of pricing and detailing on market share in the absence of persuasive DTCA.
We first elaborate on the effect of price on market share. In pharmaceutical markets, price setting is a result of many complex factors. Some notable examples of these factors are: characteristics of the drug, prevalent health care policy and managed care issues. In this market, the final decision on a prescription is made by a physician. This leads to the following observations: 1) Patients do not have the opportunity to perform a direct price comparison at the time of the prescription decision.
2) Since physicians do not pay for the product and they are making a health related decision, they are less sensitive to prices. 3) Insurance typically covers the cost of medication. Insurance providers may refuse to pay for a particular product thus forcing the patient to ask the doctor for something less inexpensive but such instances are rare. 4) Given these market characteristics, price competition is not an often used tool by pharmaceutical firms to attract patients unless the competition is with other generic products. 10 However, generic competition is of importance only when the drug goes off patent.
Based on these observations, we restrict attention to competition between different pharmaceutical firms, each of whom has a patented product but these products are used for similar indications.
9 This is merely a benchmark and a change in this assumption does not affect the main results. 10 Price competition usually happens when firms want their drugs to be included in the formulary of various health insurance companies. The latter want the payments for the insurees' treatments to be minimized.
We assume that market share is inelastic in price. We also assume complete market coverage in all further analysis, that is, all patients who walk into a doctor's office are prescribed a medicine of either Firm 1 or Firm 2.
Each firm is able to convert its potential market into sales based on the relative detailing levels between the two firms. Denote the detailing level for firm i as α i . Assume that α i lies in the range [0, 1] . Consider now the case when two firms compete in the same market but one of the firms has higher detailing productivity than the other (this implies a greater degree of influence in the doctor's office). There are many drivers of higher productivity. For example, some firms have better sales rep training programs. This enables them to deliver messages that are more convincing. Firms with a longer history have reps in the field who have established strong professional relationships with doctors. Such reps receive a better response from doctors for any product that they promote.
We label the firm with higher detailing productivity (or higher quality) as the "stronger" firm and analyze its effect on the competitive equilibrium. We refer to the competitor with lower detailing productivity as the "weaker" firm. We incorporate heterogeneity in detailing productivity in the model by applying a scalar factor θ ≥ 1 to the detailing effectiveness term of the stronger firm which then affects the market share. Without loss of generality, we assume firm 1 to be the stronger firm and firm 2 to be the weaker firm. Denoting the unit sales of the two firms as Sales 1 and Sales 2 respectively and the market shares as S and 1 − S, respectively (since there are only 2 firms and the market is completely covered), we assume the following functional forms for sales without persuasive DTCA.
where
When there is no persuasive DTCA, a doctor prescribes product 1 to a fraction S and product 2 to a fraction 1 − S of her patients. These shares are determined by the detailing levels of the two firms. However, when the doctor interacts with patients, a certain fraction of the patients have been exposed to persuasive DTCA and will talk about the product whose advertisement they have been exposed to. Depending on the extent of persuasive DTCA content (parametrized by k i ) and the total DTCA level δ i , a fraction of them are able to persuade the doctor about the product. However, such persuasion is relevant to the firm only if the doctor's original decision (based on detailing levels) was to prescribe the competing product. Refer to figure 1 for patient flow details.
In figure 1 , M patients walk into the doctor's office. The value of M depends on the level of informative DTCA offered by both firms. In the doctor's office this M gets split into two fractions, S · M and (1 − S) · M depending on the detailing levels of the two firms. However, a fraction of each of these two patient streams will flow into the other stream. This is the switching effect brought about by persuasive DTCA. This cross-flow is proportional to the persuasive DTCA level of the firm but operates on the share term of the competing firm. Thus, by incorporating persuasive DTCA, we can rewrite the sales equations of the two firms as:
Modeling Profit
As noted earlier, patient level price competition in pharmaceutical markets is relevant only when products go off patent. We restrict attention to competition between two pharmaceutical firms, each of whom has a patented product but these products are used for similar indications. Also we assume that the firms are homogeneous and offer similar products at the same price. For example, Viagra by Pfizer and Cialis by Lilly ICOS are prescription medicines for the same ailment and are priced comparably. It is also common for pharmaceutical firms to decide on promotional levels assuming a price for the product. For a given price p, the objective of the firm then becomes one of balancing marginal revenue due to promotion and marginal cost of promotion. Changing the price affects the margin of a sale and consequently, the optimal promotional level. 11 Next, we specify the costs of promotion for each firm. Each firm pays a variable cost of DTCA (includes both informative and persuasive elements) that increases with the levels of DTCA δ.
Further, a convex quadratic specification is assumed for δ. This implies that the cost of DTCA increases at an increasing rate. Once possible reason for this increase can be that higher investments in DTCA are at the cost of taking money away from other projects or borrowing more from the financial markets at a higher rate. A similar quadratic specification is also assumed for detailing where the higher detailing level is coming at the expense of lesser leisure time for the sales person and hence is costlier. Note that we have always referred to α and δ as the detailing and DTCA levels. We will continue to use this nomenclature, though it should be clear that the cost associated with a detailing or DTCA level is a quadratic function. Consequently, we can derive the profit for each firm, if they offer DTCA:
Subject to the following constraints:
The first two constraints are given by definition. The third constraint ensures that no firm has negative market share. 
Symmetric Strategies: Informative DTCA Only
In this game, since neither firm invests in persuasive DTCA, we set k 1 = k 2 = 0. The profit functions can then be computed from equations (1) through (7).
It is straightforward to observe that this game has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. The equilibrium detailing levels of the two firms are symmetric and given by the following expression:
The equilibrium DTCA levels are:
Symmetric Strategies: Persuasive DTCA Only
We now consider the case where both firms invest in persuasive DTCA, which implies that k 1 = k 2 = 1 and the profit expressions are given by equations (1) through (7).
This game also has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. Solving the first order conditions with respect to respective firm's δ i and α i we obtain the equilibrium levels of detailing and DTCA as:
Based on this analysis, we can perform comparative statics on the equilibrium detailing and DTCA levels for the symmetric strategy cases.
Proposition 1 Restricting attention to equilibrium outcomes for symmetric strategies:
a) The equilibrium DTCA levels under informative DTCA increases with φ but the equilibrium DTCA level under persuasive DTCA decreases with φ. Further, the equilibrium DTCA levels under informative DTCA are greater than that under persuasive DTCA when φ > b) The equilibrium detailing levels under informative DTCA are higher than that under persuasive
Proof in the appendix.
The equilibrium DTCA level is higher under informative DTCA when the untapped market potential φ is higher. However, equilibrium detailing level is always higher under informative DTCA since greater detailing effort is required to capture the market expansion that occurs due to informative DTCA. As the untapped market potential (φ) increases informative DTCA increases, but the persuasive DTCA level decreases because the latter is beneficial only for the market where patients visit the physician on their own (i.e. without informative advertising exposure).
Asymmetric Strategies: One Informative, One Persuasive
The third possible outcome is one in which one firm chooses to invest in informative DTCA while the other chooses to invest in persuasive DTCA. Without loss of generality, we assume that firm 1 invests in persuasive DTCA while firm 2 invests in informative DTCA. Hence {k 1 , k 2 } ∈ {1, 0}.
As before, we derive the profit functions for the two firms:
Once again, this game has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies and the equilibrium levels of detailing and DTCA are given by:
Equilibrium DTCA Decision
Based on the analysis of each of these 3 outcomes in the second stage of the overall game, we are in a position to analyze the equilibrium strategy that firms adopt. With this objective, we lay out the 2 by 2 matrix with the possible firm strategies and the corresponding equilibrium profit payoffs.
Firm 1 / Firm 2 Informative Persuasive
Informative π * 1 (I, I), π * 2 (I, I) π * 1 (I, P ), π * 2 (I, P ) Persuasive π * 1 (P, I), π * 2 (P, I) π * 1 (P, P ), π * 2 (P, P )
We note that since the firms are homogeneous, the (P, I) equilibrium is the same as the (I, P ) equilibrium and hence we have to check for only two equilibrium conditions. The diagonal entries are the profits to each firm under symmetric DTCA decisions. The conditions under which we observe symmetric strategy equilibria are:
If equation (21) holds then both firms choosing informative DTCA is the equilibrium. If equation (22) holds then both firms choosing persuasive DTCA is the equilibrium. We now state a proposition on the equilibrium strategy that firms would adopt in the first stage of the game.
Proposition 2 a) For a given price p, there exists at least one threshold on φ (call this φ I ) such that there exists a pure strategy equilibrium with both firms offering informative DTCA when φ is above this threshold.
b) For a given price p, there exists at least one threshold on φ (call this φ P ) such that there exists a pure strategy equilibrium with both firms offering persuasive DTCA when φ is below this threshold.
c) Whenever the (P, P ) equilibrium occurs, it is either a prisoner's dilemma or a pareto-dominated equilibrium.
d) As p tends to zero, the φ I and φ P values are unique and converge to 1 2 :
Proving the uniqueness of the φ I and φ P thresholds for any price p is analytically difficult given the complex nature of the profit functions for both firms in the asymmetric strategy case as can be seen from the expressions below:
where:
However, we show the uniqueness of the thresholds φ I and φ P and also the fact that φ I ≤ φ P by performing a grid search on p. For any given p, the thresholds can be computed by setting the equilibrium conditions given by equations (21) and (22) Proposition 3 For all levels of price, when the untapped market potential (φ) is low, persuasive DTCA by both firms is the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium and when the untapped market potential is high, informative DTCA by both firms is the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The intuition for these results is as follows. When untapped market potential is sufficiently high (large φ), both firms adopt informative DTCA to convince more potential customers to talk to their doctor about their condition. In a way, this is a prerequisite to increasing sales. When the φ is low, ideally a firm would prefer that the competitor spends on informative DTCA to expand the pie while it spends on persuasive DTCA to convince the patients to talk about the firm's product.
However, the competitor realizing that this is not profitable for it adopts persuasive DTCA too.
The profits to both firms are now lower than what the profits would have been if they had both stuck to informative DTCA. Further, this can happen at a higher level of φ if the price is higher.
Hence one is more likely to observe the persuasive DTCA prisoner's dilemma for product categories with higher margins. If we relate φ to the product lifecycle, we observe that a high φ occurs at an early stage of the lifecycle and will decrease as the life of the product progresses. In the early stages of a new product category there is lack of awareness of the health condition that the drug category can treat, hence implying that the number of potential customers who walk to a doctor on their own (without informative advertising exposure) is small (1 − φ small). As the category matures the awareness of the product category increases and the size of the untapped market shrinks. Hence, one would observe both firms adopting informative DTCA in the early stages and then switching to persuasive DTCA later when φ drops below the necessary threshold.
We have now described the nature of the equilibrium when firms have the choice to adopt either informative or persuasive DTCA 12 . When firms have the same detailing productivity, symmetry is observed in DTCA strategies in (φ, p) space. This result enables us to answer the first question that we had posed: how does the optimal detailing level change with the introduction of DTCA?
To answer this question completely, we need to evaluate the results of the case when firms offer only detailing but no DTCA of either kind.
Symmetric strategies: Detailing but no DTCA
In this outcome, no DTCA is offered by either firm. Hence we remove all DTCA related terms from the profit function. For this purpose, we use the sales functions given by equations (2) and (3):
This has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies characterized by the following detailing levels:
A comparison with the previous sections leads us to a proposition on how optimal detailing levels change with the introduction of DTCA.
Proposition 4 a) At high φ, both firms adopt informative DTCA. This increases the equilibrium detailing levels as compared to the case when no DTCA was offered.
b) At low φ, both firms adopt persuasive DTCA. This decreases the equilibrium detailing levels as compared to the case when no DTCA was offered.
12 Firms may potentially offer advertising content that is a mixture of informative and persuasive elements. This admits the possibility that the optimal k i is between 0 and 1. However, the analysis for this setting would be analytically intractable though possible numerically. We expect that this would simply reveal a gradual change from informative to persuasive advertising as φ decreases.
Evaluating these results in the context of the product lifecycle, we infer that when a product is at an early stage of the product lifecycle, a firm should expect to increase its detailing investment when it introduces DTCA since the type of DTCA used by all competing firms would be informative.
The informative DTCA will result in more consumers walking up to the doctor. To reap the benefit of this DTCA effort via increased prescriptions by doctors for its own product, the firm will need to inform the doctors about its product. This is achieved by increasing the detailing effort. This would also mean an increase in overall promotional spend as compared to the "no DTCA" case. At a later stage in the product lifecycle, the firm should expect all competing firms to use persuasive DTCA. The effect of persuasive DTCA is that the consumers ask their doctor for the firm's product and this reduces the need for detailing investment. It is at this stage that the original intuition of marketing managers gets validation. A shift occurs in promotional expenditure from detailing to persuasive DTCA.
Symmetric Strategies with Heterogeneous Firms
We now turn our attention to the case where firms are heterogenous in detailing productivities.
Without loss of generality we assume that firm 1 has a detailing productivity of θ > 1 and firm 2 has a detailing productivity of 1. As mentioned earlier, firm 1 with higher detailing productivity is labeled the "stronger" firm and firm 2, the "weaker" firm. We first analyze the symmetric strategy cases.
Both Firms offer Informative DTCA
Equations (8) and (9) provide the profit functions for the two firms in this setting. Each firm maximizes profit over its detailing and DTCA levels: α i and δ i .
However, unlike the homogeneous firms case, we have θ > 1 since firm 1 is stronger in detailing than firm 2. This game has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies that is given by the following detailing and DTCA levels:
This equilibrium result allows us to state a proposition on the policy that firms adopt in this setting.
Proposition 5 When firms differ in their detailing productivity and both firms adopt informative DTCA, the "stronger" firm offers a higher level of DTCA than the "weaker" firm and makes higher profits.
Proof in the appendix
When a firm knows that it is more influential in the doctor's office, it can capture a greater share of any market expansion that occurs. Hence, it has a greater incentive to invest in market expansion.
Using the same logic, the weaker firm has less incentive to invest in market expansion. The net outcome is that the stronger firm makes a higher profit. This result fits the hypothesis by that firms with weaker influence in the doctor's office should invest less in DTCA since a larger part of the category expansion is captured by the stronger firm.
Both Firms offer Persuasive DTCA
Equations (12) and (13) provide the profit functions for the two firms in this setting. Each firm maximizes profit over its detailing and DTCA levels: α i and δ i .
than firm 2. This game has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies that is given by the following detailing and DTCA levels:
Proposition 6 a) When firms differ in their detailing productivity and both firms adopt persuasive DTCA, the weaker firm offers a higher level of DTCA than the stronger firm.
b) However, the weaker firm makes higher profit (π * 2 > π * 1 ) only when:
When a firm knows that its competitor is more influential in the doctor's office, it has a larger pool of patients that it can influence and convert to its product through persuasive DTCA. Hence, its investment levels in persuasive DTCA are larger. Using the same logic, the stronger firm has less incentive to invest in persuasive DTCA for it can convince the doctors to prescribe its product via more productive detailing. However the net outcome in terms of profit is less clear. If the untapped market potential φ is low enough and price p is high enough, the weaker firm can make higher profit using persuasive DTCA. Without these conditions on p and φ, the weaker firm makes lower profit even if it invests more in DTCA. This result could be one of the important factors that drives the aggressive use of persuasive DTCA for Lunesta by Sepracor. This addresses our second question: when would weaker firms adopt larger levels of DTCA as compared to stronger firms. The basic answer is that if heterogeneous firms attain an equilibrium with both firms adopting persuasive DTCA, the weaker firm invests more in DTCA, although it may or may not earn higher profit. 
Equilibrium Analysis with Heterogeneous Firms
When firms are heterogeneous in detailing productivities, equilibrium analysis is no longer mathematically tractable. This occurs because the asymmetric strategy case (one firm informative while the other persuasive) does not have closed form solutions. Hence, we analyze the equilibrium results numerically for different values of the detailing productivity parameter θ. Figures 3 and 4 represent the equilibrium regions for θ = 1.1 and 1.4 respectively. In both figures, we also plot the homogeneous firms (identical detailing productivities, θ = 1) equilibrium regions demarcated by solid curves. The heterogeneous firms (θ > 1) equilibrium regions are demarcated by dashed curves. In each figure, the equilibrium with asymmetric DTCA strategies (one firm informative while the other persuasive) is the middle region located between the two dashed curves. 13 Further, this region represents an equilibrium where the "stronger" firm, with more productive detailing, pursues informative DTCA while the "weaker" firm pursues persuasive DTCA.
An equilibrium where the weaker firm pursues informative DTCA while the stronger firm pursues persuasive DTCA is never observed. Further, it is observed that the asymmetric equilibrium region expands as θ increases. This means that higher the heterogeneity in detailing productivities between the firms, greater is the likelihood that the firms adopt different DTCA strategies.
One similarity when comparing the homogeneous firms case with the heterogeneous firms case is the prevalence of persuasive DTCA at lower φ and higher p. However, the prevalence of persuasive DTCA at higher p grows stronger as heterogeneity across the two firms increases. In fact, when the heterogeneity between the two firms is large enough (higher θ), the weaker firm always adopts persuasive DTCA at higher price p, irrespective of φ.
These results convey an answer to the third question on when firms would pursue informative DTCA voluntarily. Clearly, firms would adopt informative DTCA during the early phase of the product lifecycle when φ is high. Further, one is more likely to see the stronger firm pursuing informative DTCA. Finally, when one firm is significantly weaker in detailing, it is never likely to pursue informative DTCA when the product has high margin associated with it. This provides some guidance to regulatory authorities on when they might have to spend time and money to direct firms to adopt informative DTCA since persuasive DTCA is believed to reduce consumer welfare.
Discussion
A large body of empirical literature is developing around the ROI implications of DTCA in the pharmaceutical market. Much of this literature aims at measuring the ROI that DTCA provides when compared to the commonly used promotional tool of detailing. Some effort has gone into addressing issues such as how these elements of the marketing mix might interact and what specific implications these methods of promotion may have in the doctor's office. However there is little theoretical or empirical work in this area that formalizes how firms in a competitive environment would allocate resources across detailing and DTCA. Our work formulates a theoretical approach towards answering this problem with the view that the results of our theory may provide empirically testable hypotheses.
We study the impact of DTCA in a competitive environment where firms also use detailing. Based on empirical and anecdotal evidence, we assume two effects that DTCA might have in pharmaceutical markets. These two effects are titled informative and persuasive respectively. While informative DTCA informs consumers about the existence of a product, persuasive DTCA encourages product purchase by making competing products appear less substitutable. Of course, the doctor makes the final decision on the prescription and hence, even if a patient talks to a doctor about a particular brand, it is essential that the doctor has enough information on the brand through detailing to make a decision in the brand's favor. We take this factor into account in our model.
Our results reveal different insights depending on the type of DTCA. When firms are homogeneous in terms of detailing productivities, they will tend to use both detailing and informative DTCA when there is a large enough untapped market. However, when the untapped market is small the firms will adopt detailing and persuasive DTCA. Also, the level of detailing goes up when both firms adopt informative DTCA. In contrast, the level of detailing goes down when both firms adopt persuasive DTCA. This helps in guiding managers as to when they should reduce detailing effort while increasing DTCA spending.
Next, we study the case where there is heterogeneity in detailing productivities. The "stronger" firm has higher detailing productivity (higher the detailing productivity, greater the degree of influence in the doctor's office). If the firms were to offer only informative DTCA in this case, then the "stronger" firm ends up spending more on DTCA because it can reap the benefits of market expansion through more productive detailing. However, if both firms were to offer persuasive DTCA then the "weaker" firm spends more on DTCA. The "weaker" firm realizes that it can overcome its shortcoming on detailing productivity by convincing the consumers to ask the doctors for its product. When the "stronger" firm is much better on detailing (productivity being very high) and product margins are high, the "weaker" firm always adopts persuasive DTCA in equilibrium even when there is a large untapped market.
This research can be extended in many interesting directions. So far, we have only considered informative and persuasive DTCA in a static environment. Speculation is common among pharmaceutical firms on whether it is better to spend promotional dollars to increase drug compliance.
In our model, this effect of DTCA can be captured by incorporating demand that is a dynamic function of DTCA and there is some patient loss from one period to the next. The firm would then have to decide on whether it should prevent this patient loss or not. Another promising avenue is to study the dynamics of DTCA and detailing in a competitive setting where a branded product competes with a generic product. Further, a study incorporating the role of "branded" generic drugs (example, Pfizer deciding to sell the generic version of Zoloft through its generic division, Greenstone Ltd.) would help in understanding the realignment of detailing and DTCA to deter entry. The generic brand in such a context is analogous to a private label brand in the consumer packaged goods industry.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 a) Comparing equilibrium DTCA levels across the informative and persuasive cases using equations (11) and (14):
only when:
or:
Taking first derivative of equation (11) with respect to φ we obtain:
and taking the derivative of equation (14) with respect to φ we obtain:
b) This is shown through a simple comparison between equations (10) and (15) .
Taking limits as p tends to zero gives:
This simplifies to:
which again has a unique solution at φ = 1 2 . This implies that:
Proof of proposition 4 a) When both firms adopt informative DTCA, the equilibrium detailing level is given by equation (10):
When firms offer detailing only, the equilibrium detailing level is given by equation (23):
Simple inspection reveals that α * (informative DTCA) ≥ α * (No DTCA) b) When both firms adopt persuasive DTCA, the equilibrium detailing level is given by equation (15):
Simple inspection with the benchmark detailing expression given in part a) reveals that α * (informative DTCA) ≤ α * (No DTCA).
